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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Supreme Court No, 920114

v.

Court of Appeals No. 900473-CA

C. DEAN LARSEN,

Category No. 14

Defendant/Petitioner.
REPLY BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ARGUMENT
I.

Scienter is an Independent Element of a Criminal
Violation of Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21

The State does not question the decree of Utah's
legislature that a "general purpose" of the Utah Uniform
Securities Act is to coordinate the interpretation of the Utah
Act with the related federal regulation.
§ 61-1-27.

See Utah Code Ann.

Further, the State presents nothing to dispute that a

violation of Rule 10b-5, the model for what became Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-1, requires proof of scienter.

Finally, the State never

questions, from a policy view, the importance of the scienter
requirement and the significance of aligning the construction of
Section 61-1-1 with federal court interpretation of Rule 10b-5.

-1-

Nonetheless, the State urges the Court to ignore the
independent scienter element of Rule 10b-5 in construing section
61-1-1.

The State argues that the unrelated congressional intent

of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q, which does not
require scienter, should be substituted for the legislative
intent for § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, which was
the enabling statute for Rule 10b-5, and which requires scienter.
State's br. at 12-20.

The State suggests alternatively that

because neither the term "scienter" nor its components are
expressly enumerated among the terms of sections 61-1-1 and 61-121, the Court should not recognize the independent scienter element
of Rule 10b-5, which was the pattern for section 101 of the
Uniform Securities Act and, in turn, for section 61-1-1.

The

State's arguments ignore the purpose of the Utah Act and
misconstrue the Supreme Court's decisions.
A.

Section 61-1-1 Is Based On Rule 10b-5, Not on
Section 17fa)

The State does not question that a violation of § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 requires proof of scienter, as the Court in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201, 212-14 (1976)
explained.1

Yet, the State charges that Mr. Larsen "erroneously

x

The State implies that because Hochfelder was a civil
action, the scienter element would not apply in a criminal
prosecution. States br. at 7. However, that Hochfelder was a
civil and not criminal case, is not significant as the Supreme
Court explained: "In our view, the rational of Hochfelder
(continued...)
-2188X28961.1

views Hochfelder in isolation" and fails to give "due weight" to
one other Supreme Court case, Aaron v. S.E.C., which discussed
separately § 17(a) and Rule 10b-5.
reasons this way:

State's br. at 13. The State

because language for Rule 10b-5 was borrowed in

part from § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, then the intent of § 17(a)(2),
as defined in Aaron, must govern or be "at least as instructive"
as the Hochfelder ruling, in construing Rule 10b-5, the model for
what became section 61-1-1 of the Utah Act.
16.

State's br. at 14-

Then, citing only the portion of Aaron that analyzes §

17(a), the State concludes that "the Supreme Court case law
interpreting related federal regulation" does not dictate that
section 61-1-1 be construed to require proof of scienter.
State's br. at 15.2

1

(...continued)
ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element
of a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the
identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought."
Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
2

The State now employs the phrase "interpreting related
federal regulation" which closely resembles the important
language of purpose in section 61-1-27, leaving the incorrect
impression that § 17(a) is "the" federal regulation related to
section 61-1-1. State's br. at 15. The State builds on this
misconception, stating that § 17(a), "through rule 10b-5 was a model
for section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act and therefore
section 61-1-1." State's br. at 16 (emphasis supplied).
Contrary to the impression left by these carefully worded
statements, the truth is that Rule 10b-5 alone, and not § 17(a)
of the 1933 Act, is the federal regulation related to section 611-1. See Uniform Securities Act § 101, Official Comment,
reprinted in Louis B. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities
Act, 6 (1976); Petitioners br. at 7-10.
-3-

Unmasked, the State's argument is an attempt to switch
the congressional intent of § 10(b) of 1934 Act (and thus, of
Rule 10b-5), with the very different intent of § 17(a)(2) of the
1933 Act.

However, the State's syllogism is defective and

misconstrues the Supreme Court decisions; here, the eye is
quicker than the hand.
1.

Aaron v. S.E.C.

Apart from the inherent defect in logic in the State's
position,3 Aaron does not condone the State's intent-switching
analysis.

The Aaron court confirmed that the intent of Rule 10b-5

is discerned from the language and congressional intent § 10(b),
the statute under which Rule 10b-5 was promulgated,

Aaron, 446

U.S. at 691 ("since the Commission's rule-making power was
necessarily limited by the ambit of its statutory authority, the
fHochfelderl Court reasoned that Rule 10b-5 must likewise be
restricted to conduct involving scienter.") (emphasis supplied).
See also Petitioner's br. at 7-10.

3

It does not follow that by borrowing language from
§ 17(a)(2) (a statute allowing prosecution without proof of
scienter), for use in Rule 10b-5 (a rule promulgated under a
statute requiring proof of scienter), that the legislative intent
of § 17(a) would somehow override known congressional intent for
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Moreover, the different intents of §
10(b) and § 17(a) are incompatible; they cannot be combined to
form a useful guide for interpretation. The State's argument,
which ignores congressional intent for Rule 10b-5, fails to
reconcile this.
-4188X28961.1

The Aaron Court, like the Court in Hochfelder/
construed Rule 10b-5 without substituting the legislative intent
of § 17(a)(2), as the State does.
Aaron, 446 U.S. at 689-91;

State's br. at 14-16.

See

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197-214.

Similarly, the Aaron Court construed § 17(a) independently,
according to its own legislative history and language.
446 U.S. at 695-700.

Aaron,

The Supreme Court found no "expression of

congressional intent in the legislative history" of § 17(a) that
scienter was required under § 17(a)(2) and (3). JId. at 697/
On the other hand, the Aaron Court reaffirmed that the
legislative history and plain meaning of the language of § 10(b),
and the structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, show that scienter
is an element of a Rule 10b-5 violation. Id., at 690-91, 695
("the controlling precedent here is . . . Hochfelder.
Accordingly, we conclude that scienter is a necessary element of
a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5").
In short, contrary to the State's contention, the
Supreme Court cases construing the intent of Rule 10b-5 and §
17(a), including Aaron (and Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983),
which the State overlooks), do not authorize switching the
congressional intent of § 17(a) with the intent of § 10(b) to

A

The Court, however, in determining the intent necessary to
warrant injunctive relief, went on to note that "[t]his is not to
say, however, that scienter has no bearing at all on whether a
district court should enjoin a person violating or about to
violate § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3)." Aaron, 446 U.S. at 697, 701.
-5-

construe Rule 10b-5 and provisions patterned after it such as
section 61-1-1.5
2.

The Stated Authorities

This is unchanged by other decisions the State cites.
Neither State v. Tembv, 108 Wis. 2d 521, 528-29, 322 N.W.2d 522,
526-27 (1982) nor People v. Whitlow, 89 111. 2d 322, 324-35, 433
N.E.2d 629, 634 (1982), which construed "61-1-1(2)-type"
provisions, even cite Rule 10b-5, yet alone construe it with the
intent of § 17(a).

State's br. at 16.

Tembv, which does not

mention section 101 of the Uniform Act, implies that the court
relied on § 17(a) as a model for Wisconsin simply based on
language similarity.
different.

322 N.E.2d at 526 n.l. Whitlow is no

433 N.E.2d at 633-34 (the court concluded that

§ 17(a) is "closely analogous" to the statute at issue).

These

cases say nothing of congressional intent in applying Rule 10b-5.
The same is true of the State's remaining authorities.
State's br. at 17-18.

As previously explained, many of these

state decisions are based on statutes lacking the legislative
purpose that guides construction of section 61-1-1 of the Utah
Act.

See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27; Petitioner's br. at 13-14.

5

The State also attempts to divert Court attention from the
congressional intent underlying Rule 10b-5 by picking at Rule
10b-5, noting that it was "hastily drafted," and discounting
Hochfelder, saying that the Supreme Court did not "thoroughly
analyze" the language of Rule 10b-5, all as though congressional
intent were not at issue. State's Br. at 14.
-6188\28961.1

Other decisions make no mention of section 101 of the Uniform
Securities Act, of the legislative intent of Rule 10b-5 and of
Hochfelder.

Petitioner's br. at 13-14.6

Thus, while such

decisions, which collide with Hochfelder, may provide useful
authority to construe laws based upon § 17(a), they do not assist
states like Utah where the statutory counterpart is Rule 10b-5.
See State v. Puckett, 6 Kan. App. 2d 688, 634 P.2d 144 (1981),
aff'd, 230 Kan. 296, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982); People v. Terranova,
38 Colo. App. 476, 563 P.2d 363, 365-66 (1977).
The State also cites United States v. Chiarella, 588
F.2d 1358, 1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), and
United States v. Charnav, 537 F.2d 341, 351-52 (7th Cir.), cert,
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976), implying that these cases reject
the scienter element in Rule 10b-5 prosecutions.
19.7

This argument is defective on two counts:

State's br. at
First, the

State artificially narrows its definition (and analysis) of

6

Even the State appears to agree that the persuasiveness
here of such state court decisions depends on the applicability
of Hochfelder. State's br. at 18 (arguing that while the state
court decisions it cites may conflict with Hochfelder, Hochfelder
should not be viewed as "controlling authority"). And, the State
does not reconcile the divergent analyses of these cases with the
plain legislative purpose of the Utah Act and the known
legislative intent of Rule 10b-5, the ultimate model for section
61-1-1.
7

The court in Charnav relied on pre-Hochfelder authority
which, to the extent it did not require proof of scienter, now is
of little value. 537 F.2d at 351-52; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
212-14.
-7-

"scienter" to "the intent to defraud."

State's br. at 5-6 n.2.

Such intent is only one alternative proof requirement of the
scienter element in a Rule 10b-5 prosecution.

See Hochfelder,

425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (scienter embraces the "intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud").
Second, and contrary to what the State implies,
Chiarella does not retreat from the scienter requirement of
Hochfelder.

Chiarella held that the trial court's instruction

omitting intent to defraud was proper where the trial court chose
instead to instruct the jury that it must not find the opposite
of such intent; i.e., that the defendant acted deliberately, "and
not as a result of 'innocent mistakes, negligence, or
inadvertence or other innocent conduct.'"
(emphasis supplied).

588 F.2d at 1370

The effect is synonymous.

By requiring the jury to find that Chiarella's conduct
did not result from negligence or other innocent conduct, the
Chiarella court only told the jury that it could not convict if
the accused acted in good faith — the converse of intent to
defraud.

This instruction, like the instruction in United States

v. Chestman, 704 F. Supp. 451, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 947
F.2d 551 (2nd Cir. 1991), was a proper alternative scienter
instruction.

See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 674 n.ll (1983) (Blackman,

J. dissenting) ("Moreover, if the insider in good faith does not
believe that the information is material or non-public, he also
-8188\28961.1

lacks the necessary scienter.

In fact, the scienter requirement

functions in part to protect good faith errors of this type
(citations omitted)).8
Unlike the jury charge given in Chiarella, Mr. Larsen's
instruction on good faith was refused.
Instr. No. 30 (R.1381).9

See Larsen's Requested

And, the alternative definitions of

the scienter element, including the components of good faith
provided in Chiarella, were not instructed, contrary to the
State's contention.

State's br. at 19 (saying that Chiarella

upheld jury instructions "similar" to those given at Mr. Larsen's
trial).

The jury here was told that it could find a violation of

8

After citing Chiarella and Chestman, which confirm that a
Rule 10b-5 violation cannot be predicated on innocent mistake,
negligence or inadvertence, the State inconsistently argues that
"a good faith defense is not applicable." State's br. at 21.
This ignores the controlling Supreme Court decisions. See
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212 n.31; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674 n.ll.
The State's citation to the pre-Hochfelder case Sparrow v. United
States, 402 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1968) and United States v. Bover,
694 F.2d 58, 60 (3rd Cir. 1982), offer no help. Sparrow was
overruled by Hochfelder to the extent it rejected a good faith
defense. See 425 U.S. at 211 n.31; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674 n.ll.
Bover recognized scienter as "the substantive element of the
offense." 694 F.2d at 60. The scienter requirement functions in
part "to protect good faith errors." Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674
n.ll.
9

This refusal, and the trial court's refusal to instruct the
jury concerning the independent element of scienter, was
reversible error. See State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah
1991) (the absence of an instruction on all elements necessary to
convict is "reversible error as a matter of law.") Mr. Larsen's
requested (but refused) instructions, which cited Hochfelder,
were plainly "sufficient to apprise the court of the theory of
defense." Stapleman v. State, 680 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo. 1984);
Larsen's Requested Instr. Nos. 4, 5, 30 (R. 1353-56, 1381).
-9-

section 61-1-1 with proof of "willfulnessM alone and that only
ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves that intent was a
defense.

Jury Instr. Nos. 14, 17, 17A (R. 1309, 1312-13).

And,

while willfulness is an element of proof for a criminal violation
of Section 61-1-1 (as it is for Rule 10b-5, 15 U.S.C. § 77x), it
does not encompass the separate element of scienter.

Dirks, 463

U.S. at 663 n.23 (Scienter "is an independent element of a Rule
10b-5 violation.") (emphasis supplied).10
3.

The Legislative Purpose of Section 61-1-1

The State chides Mr. Larsen for acknowledging a simple
truth:
Act —

to effectuate the general legislative purpose of the Utah
"to coordinate the interpretation and administration of

this chapter with the related federal regulation" —

the Utah Act

and the related federal law "must" be similarly construed.
br. at 9-10, 18-19; § 61-1-1.

State

The State does not explain how

otherwise to interpret the Utah Act and related federal law to
fulfill this purpose.

And, while the State contends that Utah

i0

This refutes the State's claim that the only culpable
mental state required to establish securities fraud is
"wilfully." State's br. at 16-17. Because no additional mental
element is contained in the "plain language" of the statute, the
State argues, no additional element is necessary. State's br. at
7-8. Section 61-1-21 requires that a person act wilfully before
criminal penalties arise. The related federal legislation
contains a very similar provision requiring that a person act
"wilfully" before a criminal penalty may be imposed. See 15
U.S.C. § 77x. However, as previously explained, the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that a showing of scienter is
a separate and independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation.
Aaron 446 U.S. at 690-91.
-10188\28961.1

courts are "free" to disregard the interpretation of the related
federal regulation (State's br. at 19), the Court is guided in
construing section 61-1-1 by "[t]he primary rule of statutory
interpretation [which] is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve."

Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991)

(emphasis supplied).

In short, the State's reliance on § 17(a)

and cases construing § 17(a) instead of Rule 10b-5, is unfounded.
B.

Scienter is an Independent Element

The State argues alternatively that congressional
intent making scienter an element of Rule 10b-5, and the
legislative purpose of the Utah Act should be ignored because the
"plain language" of sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21, read in
isolation, seem to allow prosecution without proof of
scienter.11

State's br. at 7-10.

As previously discussed, the

State's argument ignores the congressional intent of the model
for section 61-1-1 and it defeats the purpose of the Utah Act.

n

Specifically, the State says that nothing in the language
"gives rise to an intent to defraud element," again incorrectly
limiting its definition of scienter to suit its analysis.
State's br. at 7. Employing this narrow definition, the State
cites several statutes containing the phrase "intent to defraud"
and concludes that Utah's legislature never required proof of
such intent unless the phrase "intent to defraud" expressly
appears. State's br. at 10. However, even if this "survey"
would permit the inference intended by the State, the inference
cannot carry to the actual, broader definition of scienter the
State ignores. See, e.g. , Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
-11-

The Supreme Court in Hochfelder rejected a similar
argument.

The Securities and Exchange Commission argued that

Rule 10b-5(b) and (c) (with language like section 6-1-1(2) and
(3)), standing alone, could encompass intentional and negligent
conduct.

425 U.S. at 212. The Hochfelder Court, however, held

that scienter "is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5
violation."

Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 n.23 (citing to Hochfelder)

(emphasis supplied).

This interpretation is based largely upon

the congressional intent of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the enabling
legislation for Rule 10b-5.

Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201 (§ 10(b)

was intended by Congress to address "practices that involve some
element of scienter . . . " ) ; Aaron, 446 U.S. at 691.

The scope

of Rule 10b-5 does not exceed the power granted by Congress under
§ 10(b).

446 U.S. at 691. Thus, even though the language of

Rule 10b-5(b), like section 61-1-1(2), when viewed alone, could
be "read as prescribing . . . any type of material misstatement
or omission, and any course of conduct, that has the effect of
defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or
not," Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212, violations were intended to
require proof of scienter. JEd. See also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 700
("In the absence of a conflict between reasonably plain meaning
and legislative history, the words of the statute must prevail.")
(emphasis supplied).
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This interpretation is consistent with considerations
of policy that the State overlooks.

Petitioner's brief at 16-18.

Even in the context of a civil action, the Supreme Court in
Hochfelder was troubled that by accepting the view that scienter
was unnecessary, the Court "would extend to new frontiers the
'hazards' of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising
serious policy questions not yet addressed by Congress."
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.

The Hochfelder court noted

that it was not "the first court to express concern that the
inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in
this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than
good."

.Id. The scienter requirement abates these significant

concerns.
While the State does not question these concerns, it
denies that the interpretation it urges has a strict liability
effect.

State's br. at 21. However, other courts correctly

recognize that the State's position imposes "a forni of strict
liability."

People v. Mitchell, 175 Mich. App. 83, 437 N.W.2d

304, 308 (1989), citing Van Duvse v. Israel, 486 F. Supp. 1382,
1387 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (emphasis removed).
Section 61-1-1 was patterned after Rule 10(b)-5, "the
logical model" for the Uniform Act.
the Uniform Securities Act, 7 (1976).

Louis B. Loss, Commentary on
By adopting the Uniform

Act, Utah's legislature made possible "the interchangeability of
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judicial precedents in this important area."
Bennett, Securities Regulation in Utah:

See Wallace F.

A Recap of History and

the New Uniform Act, 1963 Utah L. Rev. 216, 232 n.112.

This is

plainly contemplated by the express purpose of the Uniform Act —
"to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this
chapter with the related federal regulation."
§ 6-1-27.

Utah Code Ann.

Federal court interpretation of Rule 10b-5 should

apply to section 61-1-1 in order to advance this purpose.
II.

Id.12

The Court of Appeals Misapplied the Law Concerning
Expert Witness Testimony
A.

The Court of Appeal's Reliance on Lueben is
Mistaken

The State concedes that in reviewing the trial court's
decision to admit Sherwood Cook's testimony, the "Court of
Appeals relied heavily" on United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 179
(5th Cir. 1987) ("Lueben I").13

Indeed, Lueben I forms the

12

The State's reliance on cases construing provisions other
than section 61-1-1 is flawed first because the intent for
section 61-1-1 is found in its express legislative purpose and
known model which requires scienter, not in the language of the
different statutes these cases construe. See State v. Delmotte,
665 P.2d 1314, 1325 (Utah 1983) (construing bad check statute);
State v. Bergwerff, 777 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah App. 1989)
(construing arson statute). And, again the State incorrectly
limits its scienter analysis to cases addressing only "intent to
defraud." State's br. at 8-9.
13

The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's ruling
under a "clear showing of abuse" standard. State v. Larsen, 828
P.2d 487, 492 (Utah App. 1992). This standard of review
apparently accorded even greater deference to the trial court's
decision than the simple abuse-of-discretion standard advanced by
(continued...)
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basis for the Court of Appeals' opinion.

Yetf the entire

analysis in Lueben I adopted by the Court of Appeals was vacated
by United States v. Lueben, 816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987)
("Lueben II").

The State, by footnote, says that Lueben II was

just a "modification" that "did not appear to disturb the
substance" of Lueben I because it did not openly "criticize" the
stricken analysis.

State's br. at 25 n. 6.

The truth is, by

vacating that section of its prior decision, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit leveled ultimate
criticism.
However, even if Lueben I had not been vacated,
admitting Mr. Cook's testimony was improper under its analysis.
The State characterizes Mr. Cook's testimony, not as a legal
opinion, but "more akin to the opinion testimony on the factual
question discussed in Lueben."

State's br. at 27. This notion

is refuted by comparing the testimony proffered in Lueben with
Mr. Cook's sworn remarks.

13

( . . .continued)
the State. State's br. at 28. In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
774, 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991), the Court implied that in reviewing a
decision admitting evidence, the standard of review is higher
than simple abuse of discretion: "[wjhether a piece of evidence
is admissible is a question of law, and we always review
questions of law under a correctness standard," granting the
trial court "some discretion." Under either standard, the trial
court's incorrect decision falls beyond the realm of proper
discretion.
-15-

The defendant in Lueben offered expert testimony
concerning how savings and loan associations make real estate
loans.

812 F.2d at 183. Out of the jury's hearing, the expert

testified in substance that in making the type of loans at issue,
a savings and loan association would look only to the value of
the property securing the loan without considering the borrower's
income, employment or net worth.

Td.

See also United States v.

Lueben, 838 F.2d 751, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (appeal on remand).
The court found that " [t]he clear inference from this testimony is
that the false financial statements and income tax returns
supplied by Lueben were not 'material' to the savings and loan
associations' decision to make the loans to Lueben."
183 (emphasis added).

812 F.2d at

The expert did not say that any particular

facts were or were not "material."
The Lueben Court first explained that "an expert may
not express a conclusion of law," and that such conclusions were
correctly excluded in Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, 770 F.2d 1303
(5th Cir. 1985), where the court held that an expert's answers to
hypothetical questions would simply tell the jury what result to
reach, allowing the expert to voice a legal conclusion concerning
the proximate cause of the claimed injuries. Ld. at 184. The
court then contrasted the proffered testimony of Lueben's expert
with the impermissible testimony in Ashland and another case,
Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983), which
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upheld the exclusion of expert testimony on the legal cause of an
accident, explaining the difference this way:
[W]e think that [the expert's] testimony
falls within the permissible fact-oriented
question. Lueben sought to ask [the expert]
the factual question of whether the false
statements in this case would have "the
capacity to influence" a loan officer . • .
not the legal question of whether the
statements were "material."
Id. (emphasis added).
The fact-oriented testimony proffered in Lueben
contrasts sharply with the legal opinion given by Mr. Cook:
Q.

Mr. Cook, let's take a situation where you have a
limited partnership and there is an asset such as
an interest in another limited partnership that is
valued at approximately $175,000 that is given to
the general partner by another individual in order
to indemnify the general partner against his
losses that he might incur as general partner of
that limited partnership. Now, do you have an
opinion as to whether or not in the offering
documents those facts ought to be . . . disclosed
in an offering document similar to that one?

A.

Yes, I would consider that material information. .

Q.

Let me put this question to you. Again, assume
that you are looking at a limited partnership and
a Private Placement Memorandum, and there was an
investment manager that was supposed to make sure
that certain criteria were fulfilled before loans
were made from the limited partnership funds. And
assume, if you will, that the investment manager
never met, never operated, never exercised his
prerogative or made a recommendation, would you
want those facts disclosed in a disclosure
document to investors.

A.

Objection. . . . (off the record discussion
between Court and counsel).
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Q.

Mr. Cook, do you remember the facts and the
hypothetical situation?

A.

Would you ask it again?

Q.

Let's suppose you were examining the limited
partnership in which there is an investment
manager that will make certain recommendations as
to how money is going to be used from the limited
partnership, specifically regarding certain loan
criteria. And let's assume also that the
investment manager never functioned, never made
those recommendations and, in fact, ever met.
Would you want those facts disclosed in a
disclosure document to investors?

A.

Yes, that would also be material.

(Transcript Vol. VI at 87-91)(emphasis added).
Thus, unlike the expert in Lueben, Mr. Cook did not
just testify that certain information "would have the capacity to
influence."

Compare, Lueben, 812 F.2d at 184. Mr. Cook told

the jury that the information was "material" and should have been
disclosed. (Transcript Vol. VI at 87-91).

In effect he told the

jury that Mr. Larsen was guilty.1*

1A

Cook's conclusions also reveal that the Court of Appeals'
remark that Mr. Cook used the term "material" in a "factual
sense" is unfounded. State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah
App. 1992). Cook's testimony confirms that Mr. Cook, the lawyer
and securities regulator, used the term "material" as an improper
legal conclusion, basing his opinions on hypothetical facts. See
Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808-09 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988),
cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1068 (1989). (Error to allow attorneyexpert witness to testify as to legal conclusions. "The expert in
the instant case did not testify on issues of fact because he
based his opinions on hypothetical facts. The expert added
nothing to resolve the salient factual issues.") And the State
does not question that as both an attorney and top securities
regulator who had previously investigated Mr. Larsen, the error
(continued...)
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Lueben I condemned such testimony.

Ld. at 184, citing

Ashland, 770 F.2d at 1311 ("[T]he expert's answers to
hypothetical questions posed in that case would simply tell the
jury what result to reach and would allow the expert to voice a
legal conclusion.")

In sum, even under the vacated Lueben I

analysis upon which the Court of Appeals depends, the Court of
Appeals' decision condoning the admission of Cook's testimony was
incorrect.
Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals mistaken reliance
on Lueben I, the State attempts to justify the result of the
court's decision, suggesting that Mr. Cook's testimony is
admissible under State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991) (expert
opined that fire had been intentionally set), United States v.
Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986) (officer of Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms allowed to testify that a device
was a firearm subject to registration with the Bureau), and
United States v. Logan, 641 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1981) (expert
testified that funds were wrongfully taken from corporation).
State's br. at 28.

However, the court in Scop v. United States,

846 F.2d 135, modified on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988),
made an important distinction between such cases, where experts

14

( . . .continued)
of allowing Mr. Cook's testimony was so prejudicial that it could
not have been corrected. 853 F.2d at 808; Marx & Co.. Inc. v.
Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 861 (1971).
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had been allowed to testify as to certain legal conclusions, and
cases like this.

846 F.2d at 141, citing, e.g., United States v.

Young, 745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1084
(1985) (police detective allowed to testify that narcotics
transaction had taken place).

The Scop court explained that the

testimony in cases like those cited here by the State, though
perhaps still offensive, was permissible because it did not
repeatedly use statutory or regulatory language indicating guilt.
Scop, 846 F.2d at 141-42.
[T]elling the jury that a defendant acted as a
"steerer" or participated in a narcotics transaction
differs from opining that the defendant "possessed
narcotics, to wit, heroin, with the intent to sell,'1
or "aided and abetted the possession of heroin with
intent to sell," the functional equivalent of Whitten's
testimony in a drug case.
Id. at 142. This distinction exists here. Mr. Cook, as
explained above, did not simply testify that certain information
could influence investors.

He recited the key statutory term and

said the information was "material."
B.

Scop Provides Correct Analysis

The State attempts to distinguish Cook's testimony from
the testimony condemned in Scop, Adalman15 and Marx16.

Yet, the

State does not question the correctness of the rule these cases

15

Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir.

1986).
16

Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d
Cir. ) cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
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establish, or that cases of alleged securities fraud pose unique
difficulties when testimony like Mr. Cook's is admitted, as Scop,
Marx and Adalman explain.

See Petitioner's br. at 20-23.

The

State simply concludes that these cases do not apply because Mr.
Cook's testimony, "while it would have been better for [him] to
steer away from the term 'material'", was free of "legal
opinion."

State's br. at 27. However, compared with Cook's

testimony, the context and the testimony held improper in Scop
seem indistinguishable.
The defendants in Scop were prosecuted for mail fraud,
securities fraud and conspiracy.

The government's expert witness

was the chief investigator over for the SEC regional office and
had been a stockbroker for eight years prior to joining the SEC.
He also had personally spent over one thousand hours working on
the Scop case.

846 F.2d at 138. Like Mr. Cook, who testified of

his participation in a previous securities investigation of Mr.
Larsen (Transcript Vol. VI at 47-52, Appendix E), the Scop expert
did not testify as a witness with personal knowledge of relevant
events.

He testified as an expert in securities trading

practices, purportedly basing his testimony only on the testimony
and documentary evidence introduced at trial.

846 F.2d at 138.

When the expert was asked whether there was a scheme to defraud
investors, he was allowed to answer:

"It is my opinion that the

stock . . . was manipulated and that certain individuals were

-21-

active participants and material participants in the manipulation
of that stock . . . ." Jd.

The Scop Court held that the

expert's "repeated statements embodying legal conclusions
exceeded the permissible bounds of opinion testimony" under the
rules of evidence, noting that he drew directly upon the language
of the statute concerning "manipulation•• and "fraud."

Ici. at

138, 140.
Cook's testimony was no different.

Mr. Cook's repeated

statements embodied legal conclusions that certain information
was "material"; it drew directly upon the language of the statute
(see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989)); it exceeded the permissible
scope of expert opinion testimony.

The trial court's decision

admitting this testimony was incorrect and beyond the proper
bounds of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court should reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and trial court and remand for
new trial.
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